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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, by repealing the discriminatory Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
policy, we also honor the service and sacrifice of all who 
dedicate their lives to protecting the American people.  We honor 
the values of our nation and we close the door on a fundamental 
unfairness.1 
Throughout history, societies have relied on morality to establish 
law.  Morality is often considered the cornerstone of a civilized society, 
and as such, it is fairly natural that throughout human experience, laws 
have been based, either implicitly or explicitly, on moral judgments.  
From Hammurabi’s Code to the Ten Commandments, mankind has 
combined morality and reason to establish a rule of law with the purpose 
of defining the outer limits of human behavior.  Yet as we learn more 
about the human condition, our understanding of reason and morality are 
redefined.  As our understanding grows, we, as a society, reinvent the 
law to keep up with societal changes.  The law, therefore, is a living 
collection of humanity’s evolving understanding of itself. 
There are various types of laws that use morality as a component, 
and the Supreme Court has developed a long line of jurisprudence 
creating a particularly useful taxonomy that will be adopted as the 
analytical framework for this paper.  As evidenced by morality-based 
jurisprudence, there are four main types of morality-based legislation: 
pure, composite, embedded, and inert.2  Pure moral rationale means that 
there is no other means of justification than moral judgment, and the 
moral judgment is explicit in the law.3  Composite morality justification 
combines morality with another explicit aim such as public health or 
welfare.4  An embedded morality justification is one in which there is an 
                                                                                                                            
 1 156 CONG. REC. H3873–4024 (daily ed. May 27, 2010) (statement of Speaker 
Pelosi). 
 2 Suzanne Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking Before and After 
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1244 (2004). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 1245. 
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explicit non-moral justification asserted, but the implicit justification is 
morality.5  Finally, an inert moral rationale is a justification that relies on 
the police power or other legitimate basis of government action to take a 
moral position, but “does not actually rely on morality [for] its 
analysis.”6 
Since 1969, society has struggled with its evolving understanding 
of homosexuality and morality.7  In 1986, the Supreme Court entered the 
fray when it decided Bowers v. Hardwick.8  This case, concerning the 
validity of a Georgia sodomy statute, gave the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to add its reasoning to the understanding of homosexuality.  
The Court decided that there was no right to homosexual sodomy 
protected by the Constitution, and that the Georgia law was therefore 
valid.9  Bowers was part of a national practice of discrimination against 
homosexuals, which included a policy of discrimination against gays and 
lesbians in the military, later modified by the statute commonly referred 
to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT).10  Yet in 2003, Lawrence v. 
Texas,11 a case concerning a Texas sodomy statute similar to the one at 
issue in Bowers, not only overruled Bowers, but also held that consensual 
sexual relations between two adults, even adults of the same sex, present 
a liberty interest protected by the Constitution.12   
Prior to Lawrence, DADT faced its fair share of failed 
constitutional challenges,13 but Lawrence gave new credence to such 
challenges.14  The problem with Lawrence is that it was elusive in its 
                                                                                                                            
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 1246. 
 7 See generally DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY 
REVOLUTION (St. Martin’s Press, 1st ed. 2004).  In 1969, at a bar known as the Stonewall 
Inn in Greenwich Village, New York, NY, police conducted an early morning raid of one 
of the most prominent hangouts for homosexuals in the city.  Id.  Instead of docilely 
accepting their arrest in the face of these raids, the patrons of the Stonewall fought back 
against the police and attracted a group that began to riot.  Id.  That group continued to 
riot intermittently until it became a more organized effort to promote the idea that 
homosexuals should be able to live openly without fear of being arrested.  Id. 
 8 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 9 Id. at 190, 196. 
 10 10 U.S.C § 654 (2006). 
 11 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12 Id. at 578. 
 13 See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that homosexuals were not a suspect class deserving heightened scrutiny, 
and therefore applying rational basis review and finding DADT rational); Able v. United 
States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that DADT did not violate Equal 
Protection). 
 14 See, e.g., Hensala v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 343 F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(discharged soldier arguing that the military recoupment policy violates federal law after 
Lawrence); Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503 (2005) (discharged servicemember 
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holding, which was most likely deliberate,15 and this vagueness has left 
lower courts to struggle with its meaning, particularly the standard of 
review.16  This uncertainty led numerous courts to attempt to extract the 
meaning of Lawrence and the liberty interest or interests announced 
therein.17  In addition, such confusion is particularly relevant to a 
constitutional challenge to DADT where a court must determine how 
Lawrence applies. Inherent in such a challenge is the amount of 
deference the Court should grant Congress when it is exercising its 
Article I power to raise and support armies.18 
Considering these important questions, three circuit courts have 
come to three very different results.  The Eleventh Circuit, in Lofton v. 
                                                                                                                            
arguing that following Lawrence, his discharge was unconstitutional), appeal dismissed 
voluntarily, 193 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Walker v. Barbour, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19855, *1–2 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 12, 2009) (“plaintiff argue[d] that the Mississippi 
marriage statute; Defense of Marriage Act; . . . the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Act; and barring 
of a person convicted of felonies from military service are unconstitutional and violate[] 
the 4th, 5th, 9th and 14th amendments [sic] . . . .”).  See also Jeffrey S. Dietz, Getting 
Beyond Sodomy: Lawrence and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. 
LIBERTIES 63 (2005); Pamela Glazner, Constitutional Doctrine Meets Reality: Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell in Light of Lawrence v. Texas, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 635 (2006). 
 15 See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004). 
 16 Tribe, supra note 15 (arguing that Lawrence announced a fundamental right, but 
due to the politics of the court and the necessity to gain a majority, the court did not dare 
call it fundamental).  See also Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814–16 (9th Cir. 
2008) (discussing the difficulty courts have had interpreting Lawrence and the standard 
of review it requires); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: 
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004); 
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1399 (2004) (arguing that the privacy right announced in Lawrence does not follow 
earlier reproduction rights cases, but rather announces a new liberty interest for sexual 
intimacy for gay couples that is limited to private conduct); Nan D. Hunter, Living with 
Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence is heavy on the rhetoric 
and light on clarity, Lawrence is capable of providing a holistic due process and equal 
protection analysis to determine the cultural weight of the individual dignity involved); 
Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431 
(2005); Nelson Lund and John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence is an example of judicial hubris; 
the decision and its liberty interest will be extremely limited to near identical 
circumstances); Marc Spindelman, Colloquium: The Boundaries of Liberty after 
Lawrence v. Texas: Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615 (2004); Cass 
R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27 (2003). 
 17 See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (noting that 
other courts have grappled with standard of review required by Lawrence, whether it be 
rational basis review, or strict scrutiny); United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 
2004); United States v. Humphreys, 2005 CCA LEXIS 401 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 
29, 2005); United States v. Smith, 66 M.J. 556 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). 
 18 See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 57–60 (1st Cir. 2008).  But see Witt, 527 F.3d at 
821. 
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Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services,19 a case 
regarding adoption by homosexuals in Florida, did not apply a 
heightened standard of review.20  The court found that the Supreme 
Court identified no new fundamental right in Lawrence.21  The Ninth 
Circuit, in Witt v. Department of the Air Force,22 a case of military 
discharge under DADT, decided that Lawrence required some form of 
heightened review.23  The court also found that Lawrence identified a 
distinct liberty interest24 that should be weighed using a three-factor 
balancing test.25  The balancing test announced in Witt has since become 
the standard for heightened scrutiny post Lawrence.26  The Ninth Circuit 
also stated that although deference should be given to Congress in 
regulating the military, Congress is still subject to the limitations of due 
process.27  Finally, in another military discharge case arising under 
DADT, Cook v. Gates,28 the First Circuit held that Lawrence identified a 
protected liberty interest and required a standard of review between 
rational basis and strict scrutiny.29  The Gates court, however, relied 
heavily on judicial deference to Congress to sustain the government’s 
asserted interest under DADT.30 
The resulting three-way split has left lower courts with an 
assortment of case law interpreting Lawrence. Through close analysis of 
the split as applied to DADT, it becomes apparent that Witt provides the 
best framework following the Lawrence decision. Witt questions the 
validity of morality-based legislation generally,31 which shows both a 
closer reading of Lawrence and Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, as 
                                                                                                                            
 19 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 20 Id. at 817. 
 21 Id. 
 22 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 23 Id. at 816, 818. See also id. at 822 (Canby, J. dissenting) (noting that he would 
have strict scrutiny apply to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). 
 24 Id. at 818. 
 25 Id. at 820 (adopting the three-factor test articulated by the Supreme Court in Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) as the proper test under intermediate scrutiny). 
 26 Witt, 527 F.3d at 819. 
 27 Id. at 821. 
 28 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 29 Id. at 56. 
 30 Id. at 60. 
 31 The court states in Lawrence that “Justice Stevens’s analysis, in [its] view, should 
have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578 (2003).  In his dissent in Bowers, Justice Stevens stated that, “the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is 
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice[,]” Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that morality 
based justifications alone are an  insufficient basis on which to uphold the law).  See also 
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1243. 
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well as a greater understanding of the higher value of social harmony 
over legislated morality for morality’s sake.32  Despite the repeal of 
DADT passed by the Senate,33 and signed by the President,34 the repeal 
does not take effect until the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff certify to Congress their acceptance and the Department 
of Defense issues new regulations to enforce the nondiscrimination 
policy.35  In this interim period, DADT is still in effect, and the analysis 
herein is still applicable to challenges under DADT and challenges to 
past applications of DADT that prevent a servicemember from 
reenlisting in the armed forces.36 
Part II of this Comment establishes the legal background necessary 
to analyze the implications of Lawrence on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 125, Sodomy.  This 
section recounts the history of DADT, the law as it stood before 
Lawrence, the Lawrence decision, and the resulting three-way split.  Part 
III analyzes the morality of DADT within the taxonomy of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and seeks to establish that DADT was no longer 
constitutional after Lawrence, as demonstrated in Witt.  In this section, I 
argue that because the Court in Lawrence made Justice Stevens’s dissent 
in Bowers controlling, morality alone is an insufficient basis on which to 
legislate.  Therefore, if DADT were based only on morality, it would no 
longer survive even rational basis review.37  Alternatively, even if DADT 
                                                                                                                            
 32 ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC 
MORALITY, 1 (Clarendon Press, 1st ed. 1993).  George introduces his work with the 
following, “Laws cannot make men moral.  Only men can do that; and they can do it only 
by freely choosing to do the morally right thing for the right reason.  Laws can command 
outward conformity to moral rules, but cannot compel the internal acts of reason and will 
which make an act of external conformity to the requirements of morality a moral act.”  
Id. at 1.  Though he goes on to defend the Pre-Liberal notion that legislating morality is 
not unjust, he draws a line when such moral legislating undermines the harmony of 
society.  Id. at 90.  “The values of interpersonal harmony and friendship helps to bring 
into focus the moral requirement that the benefits and burdens of communal life 
(including legal rights and duties) be distributed fairly and with due regard for the 
particular needs and abilities of different persons.”  Id. 
 33 Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban Against Openly Gay Military Personnel, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19cong.html?_ 
r=1&scp=3&sq=don%27t%20ask&st=cse. 
 34 Aaron Gell, Obama Signs Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 22, 
2010, http://www.observer.com/2010/politics/obama-signs-dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-
watch. 
 35 S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010). 
 36 Id. at § 2(c).  The bill, as passed by the Senate, is silent as to whether the military 
will change policy to accept reenlistment of members previously discharged under 
DADT, despite the military’s general policy preventing those with other-than-honorable 
and dishonorable discharge from reenlisting.  Id. 
 37 Morality is the crux of Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence, in which he argues 
that based on the majority’s holding, other laws based on morality, such as laws against 
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is a law that combines morality and utilitarian purpose, Cook and Witt 
both call for heightened review.  Under Witt, DADT would likely be 
unconstitutional when applying intermediate scrutiny.  Cook’s deference 
to Congress can be discounted following cases in the military courts that 
explicitly question such blind deference.38  Lofton’s analysis of Lawrence 
can be discounted as obiter dictum because the Eleventh Circuit found 
that Lawrence was not controlling in that case.39  Therefore, Witt’s three-
factor test is the best interpretation of the heightened scrutiny that 
Lawrence requires. 
DADT has been abandoned because it was bad public policy.  
Furthermore, DADT could no longer pass constitutional muster before its 
repeal, regardless of whether its justification was purely moral or not.  If 
during this interim enforcement period the conditions for repealing 
DADT are not met, and Congress is unwilling to act to remove the 
policy, the Court could grant certiorari and strike down “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell.”  Furthermore, the Court could apply the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Witt for any application of DADT to an individual.  The 
courts could also use the Witt framework to reinstate any member of the 
military discharged during this interim period,40 or to reinstate a member 
of the military that was discharged in the past under the policy and 
prevented from reenlisting based on a previous DADT discharge.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Lawrence v. Texas has been problematic to lower courts and 
lawyers due primarily to its unclear language and rationale.  Before 
                                                                                                                            
“bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, 
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity . . .” are all drawn into question.  Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004). 
 39 Lofton v. Sec’y. of Dep’t. of Childr and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (finding that “the holding of Lawrence does not control the present case.  
Apart from the shared homosexuality component, there are marked differences in the 
facts of the two cases.”). 
 40 Senate Bill 4023 not only conditions the repeal of DADT on certain factors, supra 
note 34, but it also explicitly states that the repeal is not effective until 60 days after the 
last of the conditions is satisfied.  S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010).  During this 
minimum 60 day period, servicemembers could still be discharged because DADT is still 
in effect.  Id. at § 2(c). 
 41 Timothy J. Gibbons, FLA. TIMES UNION, Aug. 12, 2010, http://jacksonville.com/ 
news/military/2010-08-12/story/kings-bay-sailor-being-discharged-because-hes-gay. 
Seaman Jarod McIntosh, like others dismissed under DADT, received a less-than-
honorable discharge, which prevents reenlistment in the armed services under the various 
regulations of the service branches.  Id.  See also, Army Reg. 601–210 (2007). 
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Congress began to review “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”42 Lawrence provided 
a basis for courts to challenge DADT, and cases following Lawrence 
provided Congress with greater impetus to act.43  Even though Congress 
has now passed a repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,44 the Lawrence 
decision is critical to our understanding of the zone of privacy, the ability 
of Congress to regulate the military through other policies such as Article 
125,45 and possible challenges to DADT during the interim period before 
the policy is fully repealed.46 
A. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
The law commonly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the 
product of a compromise between former President Clinton, the military, 
and Congress.47  But military policy regarding sodomy has been around 
long before Clinton.  Since the Revolutionary War era, military policy 
called for the discharge of those found guilty of sodomy.48  The idea of 
screening homosexuals per se emerged in 1942, after the psychiatric 
community labeled homosexuality a mental illness, and the military took 
notice by issuing the first regulations outright banning homosexuals from 
serving.49  The military asked enlisting troops about their sexual 
                                                                                                                            
 42 President Barack Obama announced in his January 2010 State of the Union 
address his intent to have DADT repealed.  Since that time, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand 
has introduced an amendment to the federal budget to curb the financing of the 
investigations and dismissals under DADT.  Celeste Katz, Sen. Kristen [sic] Gillibrand 
Will Propose Budget Amendment to Cut Funding For ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/02/07/2010-02-
07_gilly_says_dont_fund_dont_ask.html.  In addition, top defense officials, including 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint 
chiefs of staff, testified before a Senate panel on Feb. 2, 2010 that they will begin the 
process of determining how, not if, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” should be repealed to 
minimally effect the military’s current operations.  Elisabeth Bumiller, Top Defense 
Officials Seek End to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/politics/03military.html. 
 43 Anna Stolley Persky, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Don’t Work? Courts and Congress 
Raise New Challenges to Policy on Gays in the Military, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 2008, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dont_ask_dont_tell_dont_work. 
 44 Hulse, supra note 33; S. 4023, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 45 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 46 S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010) (conditioning the repeal of DADT on several 
factors and stating that the repeal of DADT is not effective until sixty days after the last 
of the conditions is met). 
 47 Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 1111 (July 19, 1993). 
 48 RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF 11 (St. Martin’s Press, Griffin ed. 2005).  Unfortunate Lt. 
Gotthold Frederick Enslin “became the first known soldier to be dismissed from the U.S. 
military for homosexuality [sodomy]” in 1778.  Id. at 11. 
 49 Id. at 16–17. 
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orientation before they joined the military, and those admitting to their 
homosexuality were not allowed to join.50  Anyone later discovered or 
even alleged to be homosexual was usually discharged by the armed 
forces.51 
Yet on the campaign trail, candidate Clinton stated that, once 
elected, he would lift the ban on homosexuals from serving in the 
military.52  After taking office, President Clinton began the long process 
that would result in DADT by directing the Secretary of Defense to 
submit a draft Executive Order “ending discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in determining who may serve in the Armed  
Services . . . .”53  Congress responded to President Clinton’s executive 
order by commencing various hearings to review military policy 
regarding the service of homosexuals; this Congressional action 
diminished the chances of President Clinton’s success to overturn the 
policy banning homosexuals from serving.54  In July 1993, President 
Clinton proposed a compromise policy, which allowed homosexual 
applicants to the military to avoid answering questions about their sexual 
orientation upon entry, but after joining the armed forces, these 
homosexual servicemen and women could be separated from the military 
for admitting to being a “practicing” homosexual or for committing 
homosexual sexual acts.55  The House and Senate Armed Forces 
Committees proposed to codify the President’s policy,56 and the Act 
became law in November 1993.  DADT was not the first law Congress 
passed regulating sodomy in the military, but it was the first to expressly 
regulate sodomy by explicitly targeting homosexuals. 
On December 18, 2010, the United States Senate passed a bill 
repealing DADT, which had already been passed by the House.57  
                                                                                                                            
 50 Id. at 17. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Curtis Wilkie, Harvard Tosses Warmup Queries to Clinton On Eve of N.H. 
Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1991, at 22. 
 53 Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS 23 
(Jan. 29, 1993). 
 54 Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings 
Before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed 
Services, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed 
Forces: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993); Implications of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before 
the House Comm. on Armed Services, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
 55 Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 1111 (July 19, 1993). 
 56 S. Rep. No. 103–112, at 270 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103–200, at 287 (1993) 
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2073 at 2074. 
 57 Hulse, supra note 33. 
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President Obama has signed the bill into law.58  The language of the bill 
conditions the repeal of DADT on various factors,59 and there will be at 
least a sixty-day lag before the policy can become effective.60  This 
interim period leaves in doubt the current status of homosexual military 
members and the implications should they out themselves.61  This means 
that until DADT is fully repealed, new Department of Defense 
regulations are issued, and servicemembers can no longer be discharged 
under the policy, there is still a legal basis for challenging the application 
of DADT.  Additionally, for those servicemembers already discharged 
who seek to reenlist once DADT is fully repealed, their reenlistment may 
be barred due to their discharge status as a direct result of their discharge 
for violating DADT.  Those servicemembers still have a constitutional 
claim against their discharge status under Witt.  This is particularly 
important because the repeal passed by Congress is explicit in that it does 
not create a cause of action.62 
B. UCMJ Article 125, Sodomy 
Article 125 is a military code provision in the UCMJ that prohibits 
sodomy, similar to the Georgia law that Lawrence struck down in the 
civilian sphere.63  Article 125 defines sodomy as an “unnatural carnal 
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex . . . .”64  Like 
DADT, Article 125 punishes sexual conduct in the military; but unlike 
DADT, it does not specifically target homosexuals.65  In addition, Article 
125 does not have the same mandatory separation element.66  While the 
                                                                                                                            
 58 Gell, supra note 34. 
 59 S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010) (conditioning repeal of DADT on the receipt 
and acceptance of the report by the Secretary of Defense, written certifications of the 
President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepting the 
policy change, and the issuance of new regulations by the Department of Defense). 
 60 Id. (stating that the repeal is not effective until 60 days after the last of the listed 
conditions is satisfied). 
 61 Rowan Scarborough, Gay Troops Advised to Wait Before Coming Out, 
WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/ 
dec/20/gay-service-members-advised-to-wait-before-coming-/. 
 62 S. 4023, 111th Cong. § 2(e) (2010) (stating that this bill does not create a private 
cause of action). 
 63 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2006). 
 64 Id. “It is considered unnatural carnal copulation for a person to take into [his or 
her] mouth or anus the sexual organ of another person or of an animal; or to place [his or 
her] sexual organ into the mouth or anus of another person or of an animal; or to have 
carnal copulation in any opening of the body, except the sexual parts, with another 
person; or to have carnal copulation [in any opening of the body of] an animal.”  Manual 
for Courts-Martial, United States (hereinafter MCM) pt. IV, para. 51(c) (2008 ed.). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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definition of sodomy in Article 125 would constitute homosexual 
conduct in violation of DADT if committed by a practicing homosexual, 
Article 125 applies to both heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, 
punishing all acts within the policy’s purview.67  The application of 
Article 125 is important because if Lawrence protects consensual 
intercourse between adults conducted in private, then this could affect 
the constitutionality of Article 125.68 
C. The Law Before Lawrence v. Texas 
Before Lawrence was decided in 2003, laws criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy were constitutionally permissible under Bowers.69  
Decided in 1986, at a time when homosexuality was at the furthest 
fringes of society,70 Bowers determined that because there was not a 
history and tradition of a right protecting homosexual sodomy, states 
were free to criminalize such conduct.71  This meant that in order to 
successfully challenge laws prohibiting sodomy, the Court would not 
only have to find that such a right exists under substantive due process of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but would also have to either overrule 
Bowers or find a credible way to distinguish it. 
Because most cases challenging DADT come as substantive due 
process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,72 courts must first 
determine which standard of substantive due process review should 
apply.  The three different standards of constitutional review under the 
Due Process Clause have evolved out of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
over the past century.73  The minimal level of review is rational basis 
review: “[a]ll laws challenged under either due process or equal 
protection must meet at least rational basis review.”74  Under this 
standard, the Court will uphold the law “unless the challenger proves that 
                                                                                                                            
 67 Id.  Both sections (a) and (b) of Article 125 begin with “[a]ny person,” which 
indicates that the statute would apply to any member of the military, hetero- or 
homosexual. 10 U.S.C. §§ 925(a) and (b) (2006). 
 68 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 69 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
 70 See generally SHILTS, supra note 48. 
 71 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 196. 
 72 See, e.g., Witt, 527 F.3d at 809.  Major Witt complains that DADT is 
unconstitutional under substantive due process.  Id. at 809.  Major Witt also complains 
that DADT violates equal protection under the law.  Id. 
 73 The renowned footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938) is generally attributed as the catalyst for the consideration of fundamental 
rights targeting “discrete and insular minorities.”  From this was born the Court’s 
categorization of rights, and the corresponding levels of scrutiny.  See, e.g., ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 539 (3d ed., 2006). 
 74 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 540. 
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the law does not serve any conceivable legitimate purpose or that it is not 
a reasonable [or rational] way to attain the end.”75 
Intermediate scrutiny is the middle tier, and under this standard, the 
challenged law will be upheld if it is “substantially related to an 
important government purpose.”76  Under this standard of review, the 
government’s goal must be something more than merely legitimate: it 
must be important.  Unlike rational basis review, under intermediate 
scrutiny, the government usually bears the burden proof.77 
Finally, the most exacting standard of review is strict scrutiny.  This 
standard articulates that a law will be upheld only if it is “necessary to 
achieve a compelling government purpose.”78   The law must further be 
“narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”79  This 
most exacting standard is a least restrictive means test. Unless the 
government can prove that its goal is compelling and used the least 
restrictive means, the law will fail.80 
D. Lawrence v. Texas 
The most effective means of analyzing Lawrence, as it pertains to 
any discussion of DADT and the Lofton, Witt, and Cook circuit split, is to 
consider the opinion from the two different vantage points utilized by 
lower courts: what did the Lawrence court say or not say, and what cases 
did the Court rely on in Lawrence.  Courts have utilized the former 
method to find that Lawrence’s language does not specifically define a 
new fundamental right,81 while other courts have used Lawrence’s 
language as articulating a new liberty interest.82  Courts that have utilized 
the latter method have only done so to place Lawrence within the context 
of other fundamental rights cases to determine that Lawrence must be 
placed within this category if the decision is to make any sense.83 
In Lawrence, police in Harris County, Texas, responding to a 
weapons disturbance, entered John Geddes Lawrence’s home and 
witnessed him and another man, Tyson Garner, “engaging in a sexual 
                                                                                                                            
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983)). 
 77 Id. at 541. 
 78 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
 79 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 542 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 509 U.S. 306, 
326 (2003)). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Childr and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,  817 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
 82 See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 817 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 83 Id. at 816. 
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act.”84  Both men were arrested, tried, and convicted under a Texas 
sodomy statute that criminalized “any contact between any part of the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.”85  The 
two men challenged their convictions under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.86  The case challenged the sodomy statute on 
three bases: Equal Protection, Due Process, and whether Bowers is no 
longer good precedent.87 
1. The Court’s Language 
Justice Kennedy began the opinion explaining the nature of the 
liberty interest at issue, noting that liberty protects us from unwarranted 
governmental intrusions.88  This protection is key to the notion of a zone 
of privacy.  And the liberty at issue here, wrote Justice Kennedy, is not 
just individual liberty but also liberty in “its spatial and more 
transcendent dimensions.”89  Before expounding on its reasoning, the 
Court concluded that the proper query is “whether the petitioners were 
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their 
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution[,]” thereby bypassing the Equal Protection question, and 
directly implicating the decision in Bowers.90  The Court then reframed 
the issue in Bowers, saying that the Bowers court considered the issue in 
too narrow a scope and that the law at issue in Bowers and in Lawrence 
had greater implications “upon the most private human conduct, sexual 
                                                                                                                            
 84 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 562–63 (2003). 
 85 Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)). 
 86 Id. at 563–64. 
 87 Id. at 564. (“1. Whether Petitioners’ criminal convictions under the Texas 
‘Homosexual Conduct’ law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, 
but not identical behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee of equal protection of laws?  2. Whether Petitioners’ criminal convictions for 
adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and 
privacy protect by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?  3. Whether 
Bowers v. Hardwick . . . should be overruled?”). 
 88 Id. at 562. (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions 
into a dwelling or other private places.  In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the 
home.  And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where 
the State should not be a dominant presence.  Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. 
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct.  The instant case involves liberty of the person 
in both its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”). 
 89 Id.at 562. 
 90 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
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behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”91 The Court 
explicitly noted that the Bowers court “fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of 
the liberty at stake.”92 
After noting these deficiencies, the Court counseled “against 
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship 
or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse to an institution 
the law protects.”93  Though this edict seems to lay out a clear standard 
for courts and state legislatures, namely that the State should not regulate 
the intimate relationships between persons absent injury to another or 
abuse of a legally protected institution, the implication of this statement 
on the relationships of homosexuals and State regulation thereof is less 
clear.94  Whether marriage would constitute a legally protected institution 
that would warrant regulation of same-sex unions was never directly 
addressed by the Court. 
The Court then acknowledged that the liberty interest is further 
buttressed when it occurs within the confines of a private home.95  The 
Constitutional liberty is at its strongest, and the State’s regulatory 
authority at its weakest, when the relationship in question shows no sign 
of injury to another, or threat to a legally protected institution.96  The 
liberty interest is particularly strong when it finds expression in the 
privacy of the home, which has traditionally been recognized as one of 
the greatest domains of privacy from State intrusion.97 
                                                                                                                            
 91 Id. at 567. Justice Kennedy also notes here, “[t]he statutes do seek to control a 
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is 
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”  Id.  This 
statement indicates the Court’s unwillingness to enter the contentious debate about same-
sex marriage, even while finding that the underlying sexual act cannot constitutionally 
sustain criminal conviction. 
 92 Id. (holding that by reasoning “that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to 
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it 
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to 
have sexual intercourse.”). 
 93 Id. 
 94 It is unclear if the Court meant that it would be acceptable to criminalize adultery 
but not fornication because the former is within the confines of the legally protected 
institution of marriage and the latter is not.  It seems, based on context in the sentence, 
that the legally protected institution to which Justice Kennedy is alluding could only be 
marriage, because the court is explicitly discussing state laws that define the meaning of a 
relationship. 
 95 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id.  Justice Kennedy, in this portion of the opinion, is looking to the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding the Bill of Rights, where the constitutional guarantees of privacy 
in the home are readily apparent.  Id. at 567.  The Third Amendment, which prevents the 
government from quartering soldiers in peoples’ homes without consent of the owner, is 
one instance of a respected zone of privacy regarding one’s home.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
III.  The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is a 
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The Court’s full articulation of the liberty interest protected by the 
Constitution in Lawrence is, “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring.  The liberty protected 
by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this 
choice.”98  As evidenced by this language, the Court was exceedingly 
vague in declaring specifically what the Constitution protects. The 
holding of the opinion defined the liberty interest as intimate conduct, 
but intimate conduct is never fully defined, and the Court never 
suggested that all intimate conduct was protected by the constitution.99  
Especially when considering DADT and Article 125 of the UCMJ, the 
Court’s holding has led lower courts to struggle with the boundaries of 
the liberty interest in Lawrence, which has in turn led to great difficulty 
in discerning what protections the decision intended to confer in 
situations not exactly identical to the one in Lawrence. 
The Court’s reasoning regarding why the Texas sodomy law did not 
pass Constitutional muster is even more confusing; “[t]he Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.”100  The Court’s terminology, 
“no legitimate interest,” is a hallmark of rational basis review, yet 
typically under this standard, a law such as the one in question would 
have been considered rationally justified and thereby upheld.  This 
language has created confusion with respect to whether the Court was 
applying its traditional rational basis review, or whether it was applying a 
form of heightened scrutiny.  This is significant because only rights that 
are considered “fundamental,” and therefore assuredly protected in toto 
by the Constitution, are reviewed under heightened scrutiny. 
Consequently, lower courts have pondered whether the right expounded 
in Lawrence is really a fundamental right, because the Court never 
expressly called it such.  The significance of identification as a 
“fundamental” right is that it requires the greatest constitutional 
                                                                                                                            
similar instance of respecting the privacy, though this time of the individual.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV.  The Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, fundamentally, is a right to keep 
private information private.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  These provisions taken together 
demonstrate a zone of privacy like that articulated by the Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 98 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  It is unclear, however, if this “right” is the right to 
choose with whom to have intercourse, or if it means the right for persons of the same sex 
to form an intimate bond like a heterosexual relationship. 
 99 If Justice Kennedy really intended to implicate all intimate conduct in the decision, 
others sexually regulated acts, such as incest, statutory rape, and other sexual crimes 
would no longer be constitutionally permissible. 
 100 Id. at 578. 
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protection and the strictest standard of scrutiny, which in and of itself is 
usually outcome determinative.101 
In addition to finding that the Texas law furthered no legitimate 
interest, the Court also stated that the government made no showing that 
its “interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more 
legitimate or urgent.”102  The use of the words “legitimate” and “urgent” 
reflects terminology reminiscent of heightened scrutiny.  The lower 
courts, among others, struggle to answer the question whether the Court 
intended to implicate the traditional rubric of Due Process review when 
using this specific language in Lawrence, or if the Court intended to 
create a new standard.103 
The Court said, 
[t]he present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does 
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.104 
By defining the liberty interest in the negative, the Court established that 
there are acts not protected by the liberty interest, including intercourse 
with minors, coercive intercourse or intercourse with a high possibility of 
coercion, public intercourse, prostitution, or the formal recognition of 
homosexual unions.105  Then the Court said, “[t]he case does involve two 
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in 
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”106  This positive 
reinforcement helps establish that when the sexual conduct is between 
two consenting adults, their actions are protected. 
The Court established the above parameters based on the history of 
sodomy prosecutions in western civilization.  The Court noted that “there 
is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual 
                                                                                                                            
 101 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term–Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: 
An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 
(2006). 
 102 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). 
 103 See, e.g., United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (noting that 
other courts have struggled with standard of review required by Lawrence, whether it be 
rational basis review, or strict scrutiny) (citing Standhardt v. Superior Court of Arizona, 
77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Fields v. Palmdale School Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1221 n. 7 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 104 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
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conduct as a distinct matter.”107  It then explained that sodomy 
prosecutions typically entailed sex with minors, rape, coercion, or 
bestiality.108  The Court then contrasted the Bowers decision with the 
emerging trend of increasing tolerance for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) rights in the West, and noted that as part of this 
greater Western history and tradition, Bowers cannot stand.109  This 
seems to have altered the scope of the “history and tradition” inquiry, 
which is usually outcome determinative as Bowers readily 
demonstrates.110   By redefining the scope of the inquiry and broadening 
it to consider the Western world’s evolving history and tradition, the 
Court has either altered the way this analysis will be conducted in future 
Due Process inquiries, or it has created an aberration, enabling the Court 
to reach its ultimate conclusion. 
Justice Scalia vociferously dissented and seized on the fact that the 
Court never called the right at issue “fundamental,”111 arguing that if the 
right were “fundamental,” the Court would have been required to apply 
its traditional strict scrutiny standard.112  Instead, as Justice Scalia 
indicated, the Court overruled Bowers and struck down the Texas law 
without challenging the central legal conclusion in Bowers, that there 
was no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy.113  Justice Scalia also 
argued that Washington v. Glucksberg114 established the fact that “only 
fundamental rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this nation’s history and 
tradition’ qualify for anything other than rational basis scrutiny under the 
                                                                                                                            
 107 Id. at 568. 
 108 Id. at 569 (“[Nineteenth] century sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations 
between men and minor girls or minor boys, relations between adults involving force, 
relations between adults implicating disparity in status, or relations between men and 
animals.”).  Each of the specific categories the court details become the very exceptions 
to the protection of the liberty interest the court lays out later.  Id. 
 109 Id. at 568. 
 110 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986).  As the Court in 
Lawrence later determined, the Court’s definition of the history and tradition in Bowers 
was too narrow, and the narrowness of its definition of history and tradition was its 
precedential infirmity. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 567.  In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 
325–26 (1937), the court stated that those things deeply rooted in our nation’s history and 
traditions are those “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997) reaffirmed this principle in the modern string of fundamental rights cases. 
 111 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.  This part of Justice Scalia’s dissent has provided grounds for many courts, 
including the Lofton court, to find that the right is therefore not fundamental and no 
heightened scrutiny should apply.  See infra Part II.E.1.  See also Muth v. Frank, 412 
F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 114 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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doctrine of ‘substantive due process.’”115  Justice Scalia challenged what 
he viewed as the Court’s redefinition of history and tradition in 
Lawrence.  He argued that legislatures have always been able to legislate 
with morality, and morality legislation should be left to the prerogative 
of the state governments.116  This issue of morality legislation is likely 
one of the major reasons for the Court’s split between majority and 
dissent in this decision. 
2. The Court’s Actions 
Although the language of the Court was both confusing and 
problematic, the Court’s actions in Lawrence, as well as its justifications 
for those actions, demonstrate the Court’s intent to solidify Lawrence as 
part of the history of privacy-rights cases.  As part of its effort to reframe 
the issue in Bowers and to establish the Due Process protection of the 
right in Lawrence, the Court relied on a series of fundamental rights 
cases to solidify its Constitutional footing in Lawrence, placing 
Lawrence squarely within the privacy-rights line of cases.  The cases the 
Court relied on, other than Romer v. Evans,117 are cases in which the 
Court established a fundamental right, imbued with the greatest 
protection the Constitution affords.118 
The Court began its consideration with Griswold v. Connecticut and 
stated that Griswold “established that the right to make certain decisions 
regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”119  
Decided in 1965, Griswold set the stage for future cases in which the 
Court would look to the penumbras of Constitutional guarantees to 
define an area of personal liberty and autonomy, the zone of privacy, 
upon which the State may not encroach.120  This line of reasoning 
                                                                                                                            
 115 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721) (citing Palko, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)). 
 116 Id. at 589–90. 
 117 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  Although Romer is an Equal Protection case, and not a Due 
Process case, it is significant here for two reasons.  First, it represents the first major 
victory for the LGBT community in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gayle L. Pettinga, 
Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 
(1987).  Second, it is often considered a case where the Court applied “rational basis with 
bite,” laying some groundwork for the ambiguous standard of scrutiny used in Lawrence. 
See, e.g., id. 
 118 These cases are Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 
431 U.S. 678 (1977); and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 119 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
 120 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that 
help give them life and substance.”). 
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continued through Eisenstadt v. Baird,121 where the Court held that 
individuals, whether married or single, have the right to be free of 
government intrusion “into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”122 
Through this line of case law, the Court determined that “[o]ur 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral 
code.”123  The Court’s statement regarding morality in Casey and its 
decision to overrule Bowers directly challenges the ability of religious 
groups to legislate their own morality.  Morality is often the explicit, or 
at least an implicit, reason that opponents to LGBT rights use to justify 
regulatory policy. 
Morality’s place in the law was specifically addressed in Lawrence. 
When the Lawrence Court overruled Bowers, it held that Justice 
Stevens’s dissent should have been controlling and that his analysis 
would apply to the case at bar.124  In his dissent in Bowers, Justice 
Stevens said, “the fact that the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”125  Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Bowers may be an indication of what the Court actually meant 
when it struck down the Texas law: morality is an insufficient basis on 
its own to uphold a law that violates a constitutional liberty.  Justice 
Stevens even goes so far as to say that a legitimate interest cannot be 
justified by “a habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored 
group.”126 
This reasoning is profound because it leads to the very heart of the 
Lawrence case and the Texas statute in question: the moral judgments of 
society and their enactment into law.  Not only did the above reasoning 
allow the Court to strike down the Texas sodomy law, but it is also of 
extreme import in other contemporary battles waged over LGBT rights, 
including the legitimacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  When morality is 
removed as a basis for legislation, biases against the LGBT community 
are reduced to constitutionally violative restrictions on substantive due 
process and equal protection. 
                                                                                                                            
 121 405 U.S. 438 (1972).  This case is also an Equal Protection case, where a 
fundamental right for married couples is extended, under the guaranty of equal 
protection, to unmarried couples.  Id. at 453. 
 122 Id. at 453. 
 123 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. 
 124 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have 
been controlling in Bowers and should control here.”). 
 125 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 126 Id. at 219. 
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E. The Three-Way Circuit Split 
In the wake of Lawrence, many courts have been called upon to 
clarify its meaning and hone its standards.127  Three such cases dealing 
explicitly with homosexuality have made their way to the courts of 
appeal, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family 
Services,128 Witt v. Department of the Air Force,129 and Cook v. Gates.130  
This comment focuses only on these three cases because they center 
specifically on the treatment of homosexuals after Lawrence. 
Furthermore, these cases establish a three-way circuit split over the 
standard of review required by Lawrence,131 the constitutional test to be 
applied for heightened scrutiny,132 and the amount of deference that 
should be given to Congress when it regulates the military.133  These 
cases help answer the lingering questions about how the Lawrence and 
Bowers morality standard would apply to DADT, and the reasons for 
heightened scrutiny. 
1. Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family 
Services, Eleventh Circuit 
Although Lofton did not deal with DADT, the case considered 
whether a Florida statute that prevented homosexuals from adopting 
children was constitutional following Lawrence.134  The court began its 
analysis by asking “whether Lawrence announced a new fundamental 
right to private sexual intimacy.”135  Similar to Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Lawrence, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the fact that the Supreme 
Court had never called the right in Lawrence “fundamental.”136  This was 
of great importance because if the right were fundamental, there could be 
                                                                                                                            
 127 See, e.g., Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (striking 
down a Texas law that makes it a crime to sell or promote sexual devices following 
Lawrence); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding an 
Alabama law prohibiting the sale and promotion of sex toys under a Lawrence-based 
constitutional challenge). 
 128 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 129 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 130 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 131 In Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817, the court determines that no heightened review shall 
apply, while in Witt and Cook, both courts establish a heightened standard of review.  
Witt, 527 F.3d at 813; Cook, 528 F.3d at 56. 
 132 The Witt court establishes that the Sell test will be the applicable test under 
intermediate scrutiny, while the Cook court declines to apply that test.  Witt, 527 F.3d at 
818; Cook, 528 F.3d at 45 n.1. 
 133 The Witt court determines that deference to Congress does not require abdication, 
whereas the court in Cook does.  Witt, 527 F.3d at 821; Cook, 528 F.3d at 60. 
 134 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 806–07. 
 135 Id. at 815. 
 136 Id. at 817. 
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no question as to the standard of scrutiny required by the Court.137  
Because the Lawrence court never used this key term, the Eleventh 
Circuit explained that it was “hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty 
interest from an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent 
with standard fundamental-rights analysis.”138  The court had two major 
contentions regarding the use of the term “fundamental right.”139  
Because of what the court found as Lawrence’s narrow holding in 
articulating the right and the standard of review required, the Eleventh 
Circuit did not find any need to apply a heightened standard of review.140  
Notably , the precedential value of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Lofton is discounted by the fact that the court expressly found that 
Lawrence did not control the case at bar.141  If Lawrence was not 
controlling precedent in Lofton, then the court’s discussion of Lawrence 
reduces to mere dicta. 
2. Witt v. Department of the Air Force, Ninth Circuit 
Witt was a dramatic departure from Lofton and established a clear 
split between the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.  Major Margaret Witt was 
literally the face of the United States Air Force, prominently featured in 
Air Force recruitment and promotional materials.142  She received 
numerous medals and commendations, and she was very well regarded 
by colleagues and superiors alike.143  The case arose because Major Witt 
was in a relationship with a civilian woman for over five years while she 
was on active duty in the Air Force.144  The two women, however, never 
had sexual relations while Major Witt was on duty or while she was 
present on the grounds of any Air Force base.145  The two women shared 
a home that was located approximately 250 miles away from McChord 
Air Force Base, where Major Witt was stationed.146  During her entire 
                                                                                                                            
 137 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 138 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816. 
 139 Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21) (“First, the Lawrence opinion 
contains virtually no inquiry into the question of whether the petitioners’ asserted right is 
one of ‘those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’  Second, the opinion 
notably never provides the ‘careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest’ that is to accompany fundamental-rights analysis.”). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 809–10. 
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military career, Major Witt kept her sexual orientation a secret from her 
fellow servicemen and women.147 
In July of 2004, just a year after Lawrence was decided, Major Witt 
was notified that she was under investigation based on allegations of 
homosexuality.148  Major Witt refused to make any contact with the 
investigating officer or the Air Force chaplain who contacted her about 
her homosexuality.149  By November 2004, formal separation 
proceedings began, and Major Witt, one year short of twenty years of 
service and a full Air Force pension, was told that she would no longer 
receive any pay or points towards promotion during the proceedings.150 
After Witt received a notice of discharge action and requested an 
administrative hearing, the military board “found that Major Witt had 
engaged in homosexual acts and had stated that she was a homosexual in 
violation of DADT.”151  The Secretary of the Air Force acted on the 
board’s recommendation in July of 2007, “ordering that Major Witt 
receive an honorable discharge” from the Air Force.152  Major Witt was 
not yet separated from the military when her complaint was filed in 
federal court.153 
Major Witt argued, inter alia, that DADT violates substantive due 
process based on the holding in Lawrence.154  The Ninth Circuit began its 
analysis by noting that in order to analyze Witt’s substantive due process 
claim, it must first determine the proper level of scrutiny required by 
Lawrence.155  The court then observed that, despite the Air Force’s 
arguments that this issue has been settled by other courts of appeals, the 
only court to squarely address the issue was the Eleventh Circuit in 
Lofton, which did not apply any form of heightened review.156  The Ninth 
Circuit also noted that another court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, considered a challenge to UCMJ Article 125 implicating 
Lawrence and applied a heightened standard of review.157  Although both 
of these decisions presented persuasive authority, neither was binding, 
and the court proceeded to split from the Eleventh Circuit.158 
                                                                                                                            
 147 Id. at 810. 
 148 Witt, 527 F.3d at 810. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 812. 
 154 Witt, 527 F.3d at 811. 
 155 Id. at 813. 
 156 Id. at 815. 
 157 Id. at 816 (referencing United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).  
 158 Marcum and its progeny will be considered in a subsequent section for the parallel 
value of their analyses on the consideration of the liberty interest in Lawrence and its 
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The Ninth Circuit decided that it would be more useful to analyze 
Lawrence under the rubric of what the Court did, rather than what it said, 
because the court had no desire to deal with the subjectivity of linguistic 
analysis and parse the language of the opinion to divine its true 
meaning.159  The court reasoned that linguistic analysis of the ambiguous 
text in Lawrence would lead to a dissection of isolated passages without 
their proper context, which would lead to the problem of relying on key 
words in isolation as the basis of a judicial decision.160  Relying on the 
Lawrence court’s actions allowed the Ninth Circuit to fit Major Witt’s 
case into the privacy rights line of cases discussed in Lawrence. 
The court first noted that the Lawrence court overruled Bowers, and 
could not have done so applying rational basis review because rational 
basis review would have required the Court to determine that the law in 
question in Lawrence “lacked ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classification,’” and any 
theoretical justification would prove sufficient.161  For the Court to have 
overruled Bowers and simultaneously strike down the Texas sodomy 
statute, something more than rational basis review was required.  Had the 
Court applied mere rational basis review, a paradigm of judicial restraint, 
the Court never would have overruled Bowers or considered the liberty 
interest of Mr. Lawrence.162 
Second, the court noted that the cases relied on by the Supreme 
Court—other than Romer v. Evans—were all cases that applied 
heightened scrutiny.163  For the Supreme Court to rely on a long line of 
cases that applied heightened scrutiny, it would be counterintuitive that 
the case at bar would then be considered under the low bar of rational 
basis review.  It also seems to suggest that the Court was reframing the 
issue in Lawrence to place the case within the privacy-rights framework. 
                                                                                                                            
implications on military policy.  The decision in Marcum, however, is not being 
considered as part of the circuit split at issue in the Comment primarily because the Court 
of Appeals for the Armed Forces falls outside of the fold of the regular courts of appeals 
because it is an Article I tribunal exercising worldwide appellate jurisdiction over 
members of the U.S. Armed Forces on active duty and other persons subject to the 
UCMJ. CRS, Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Over Military Court Cases, 1 (Oct. 
6, 2008). 
 159 Witt, 527 F.3d at 816. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). 
 162 Id. (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence with the 
minimal protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”). 
 163 These cases were Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965).  See discussion of these cases supra, Part II.D.2. 
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Third, the Ninth Circuit discussed the Supreme Court’s rationale, 
analysis, and holding in Lawrence, which are inconsistent with rational 
basis review.164  Had rational basis been the standard of review, the Court 
would not have been required to “identify a legitimate interest to ‘justify’ 
the particular intrusion of liberty at issue in Lawrence; regardless of the 
liberty involved, any hypothetical rationale for the law would do.”165  
Although the discussion of a legitimate interest is a quintessential notion 
of rational basis review, and as such is a strong indication of the standard 
of review a court is applying, legitimate under rational basis review 
means nearly anything that can substantiate the law.166  Even a reason 
created post hoc is sufficient.167 
Finally, the court indicated a reluctance to apply strict scrutiny 
because the decision in Lawrence did not conclude the right was 
“fundamental,” nor did the “Supreme Court discuss narrow tailoring or a 
compelling state interest . . . .”168  In a footnote, the court indicated its 
agreement with the Lofton court that strict scrutiny should not be the 
relevant standard, but then concluded that some form of heightened 
scrutiny did apply, thereby parting ways with the Eleventh Circuit.169  
The court then turned to Sell v. United States,170 another recent 
Supreme Court case that considered a substantive due process claim, 
because Sell contained a level of “scrutiny that resembles and expands 
upon the analysis performed in Lawrence.”171  The Ninth Circuit found 
that in Sell, the Supreme Court “recognized a ‘significant’ liberty  
interest . . . and balanced that liberty interest against the ‘legitimate’ and 
‘important’ state interest . . . .”172  Because the phrasing of its analysis 
                                                                                                                            
 164 Witt, 527 F.3d at 817. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See discussion supra, Part II.E.1. 
 167 Witt, 527 F.3d at 817. 
 168 Id. at 817–18. 
 169 Id. at 818 n.6.  Here it is important to note also that Judge Canby, writing in 
dissent, would hold that strict scrutiny should apply because the Supreme Court, though it 
did not call the right at issue in Lawrence fundamental, treated it as such.  Id.  Judge 
Canby notes, “the important individual values of liberty [the Supreme Court]  
recognizes . . . require strict scrutiny of governmental encroachment on that right.”  Id. at 
823 (Canby, J., dissenting). 
 170 539 U.S. 166 (2003).  Sell was a case involving a man with a long history of 
delusional disorder who was deemed incompetent to stand trial.  Id. at 170.  Sell was 
ordered to be hospitalized and prescribed antipsychotic medication by the medical staff. 
Id. at 170–71.  Sell did not want to take the medication, and the court ordered that he be 
given the medicines involuntarily, and that this might also improve his competence to 
stand trial.  Id. at 171.  The Supreme Court’s Sell test was used to determine when the 
medication could be forcibly given under the Constitution.  Id. at 186. 
 171 Witt, 527 F.3d at 818. 
 172 Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 178). 
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and rationale so closely resembled that of Lawrence, the court stated that 
the Sell test should be controlling for the intermediate level of scrutiny 
demanded by Lawrence.173 
The court then determined that because DADT “attempts to intrude 
upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals[] in a manner that 
implicates the rights identified in Lawrence, the government must 
advance an important governmental interest, the intrusion must 
significantly further that interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to 
further that interest[,]” with no less intrusive alternative.174  The court 
found that the government advanced an important interest, namely 
management of the military, which requires deference to Congress under 
its Article I powers to “raise and support [an] arm[y].”175  Most 
importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit said, “[n]otably, ‘deference does 
not mean abdication.’”176  Here, the court is referring to the fact that 
Congress, even when regulating the military, is still subject to the 
requirements of due process.177  The court did not discuss the second or 
third criteria because it found the record lacking and would remand the 
case to determine if the government met the latter two criteria.178 
After making the above findings, the Ninth Circuit held that 
heightened scrutiny analysis is only for an as-applied constitutional 
challenge to DADT and not facial challenges.179  The court made this 
determination to “avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional 
judgments.”180  Thus, the court remanded the case to develop the record, 
and determine whether less intrusive means than DADT would “achieve 
substantially the government’s interest.”181  The court also noted that the 
“Air Force attempts to justify [DADT] by relying on congressional 
findings regarding ‘unit cohesion’ and the like, but that does not go to 
                                                                                                                            
 173 Id. at 818–19 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81) (emphasis in original) (The Sell 
test is comprised of three relevant factors: “First, a court must find that important 
governmental interests are at stake . . . .  Courts, however, must consider the facts of the 
individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest . . . .  Special circumstances may 
lessen the importance of that interest . . . .  Second, the court must conclude that [the 
policy] will significantly further those concomitant state interests . . . .  Third, the court 
must conclude that [the policy] is necessary to further those interests.  The court must 
find that any alternative, less intrusive [policies] are unlikely to achieve substantially the 
same results . . . .”). 
 174 Id. at 819. 
 175 Id. at 821. 
 176 Id. (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)). 
 177 Witt, 527 F.3d at 821 (citing Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994)). 
 178 Id. at 821. 
 179 Id. at 819. 
 180 Id. at 819 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 
(1985) (internal citations omitted)). 
 181 Id. at 821. 
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whether the application of DADT specifically to Major Witt significantly 
furthers the government’s interest . . . .”182  This final pronouncement is 
one of the most significant conclusions of the decision because the court 
questioned the government’s reliance on congressional findings as a 
justification for the policy.  Specifically, the court questioned whether 
the policy of DADT furthered the purported interest of unit cohesion, 
etc.183  By questioning Congress’s findings, the court was pitting the 
constitutional protections of due process against the Article I power of 
Congress to regulate the military. 
After the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, the government filed a 
petition for hearing en banc, which the en banc panel denied.184  Judge 
O’Scannlain, joined by Judges M. Smith and Bea, dissented from the 
denial of rehearing en banc.185  In his scathing dissent, Judge 
O’Scannlain noted the following: the creation of a circuit split by the 
panel,186 the failure of the panel to even consider whether Lawrence was 
controlling in the matter,187 the authority of the Supreme Court alone to 
carve out rights receiving intermediate level scrutiny,188 and the 
deference that should be given to Congress in making such important 
policy choices as DADT.189  This dissent, like the First Circuit’s opinion 
in Cook, argued that Congress was well within its constitutional powers 
in regulating the military, and that Congress’s decision should not lightly 
be disturbed.190  Judge Kleinfeld, a second dissenter from the denial of 
rehearing en banc, concurred in Judge O’Scannlain’s reasoning, but 
called for even greater deference to the president and Congress in 
regulating the military.191  Both of these arguments for deference would 
effectively negate heightened scrutiny because deference means any 
interest put forth by the Congress is sufficient to uphold the law. 
                                                                                                                            
 182 Id. 
 183 In the Congressional hearings for DADT, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf made 
the following statement: “In my years of military service, I have experienced the fact that 
the introduction of an open homosexual into a small unit immediately polarizes that unit 
and destroys the very bonding that is so important for the unit’s survival in time of war.”   
S. Rep. No. 103–112, at 280 (1994).  General Colin Powell also made a similar 
statement, that open homosexuality in units “involves matters of privacy and human 
sexuality that, in our judgment, if allowed to exist openly in the military, would affect the 
cohesion and well-being of the force.”   Id. at 281. 
 184 Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 548 F.3d 1264, 1265 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, 
J., dissenting). 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 1267. 
 188 Id. at 1273. 
 189 Id. at 1275–76. 
 190 Witt, 548 F.3d at 1275–76 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 191 Id. at 1276–77 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
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Chief Judge Kozinski, also writing in dissent from the denial of 
rehearing en banc, wrote, 
When we stand against the combined might of the other branches 
of government, we should ensure that our own authority is at its 
maximum. En banc rehearing—whatever the outcome—would 
have shown that we gave this matter the sustained attention it 
merits. Moreover, there is strength in numbers: The conclusions 
of an en banc court would reflect many more points of view and 
could not easily be dismissed as outliers.192 
This passage expounds several important points.  First, Chief Judge 
Kozinski noted that ruling against DADT pits the judiciary against the 
other two branches of government.193  Second, the only means by which 
the court of appeals can give its reasoning maximum authority is through 
en banc review, in which an eleven-judge panel, and not just a three-
judge panel, decides the merits of the case.194  Finally, and most 
importantly, Chief Judge Kozinski noted that any conclusion reached by 
an en banc court can hardly be dismissed as an outlying decision, having 
received the utmost attention of the entire court of appeals.195  This point 
is crucial if the Witt decision is setting the stage for a constitutional 
challenge in front of the Supreme Court, which would pay greater 
deference to a decision reached by an en banc court of appeals than just a 
three judge panel.  As Chief Judge Kozinski indicated, “Major Witt’s 
case compellingly illustrates the sometimes arbitrary and destructive 
operation of the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy.”196  For this very reason, 
if nothing else, the Ninth Circuit should have reviewed the case en banc. 
After remand, District Court Judge Ronald B. Leighton determined 
that as applied to Major Witt, DADT was not constitutional.197  The 
court’s narrow inquiry, as directed by the Ninth Circuit, was “whether 
                                                                                                                            
 192 Id. at 1280 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 193 Id. 
 194 In other circuits, en banc typically means that all the circuit judges sit and decide 
the case.  FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 108 
(Stanford University Press, 1st ed. 2007).  Yet, because the Ninth Circuit is so large, the 
panel usually only seats eleven judges, pursuant to PUB. L. NO. 95–486 (stating that for 
circuit courts with more than 15 judges, an en banc hearing may consist of “such number 
of members of its en banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals..”). 
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996); Campbell v. 
Wood, 20 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 
1980). The Fifth Circuit, with 17 judges, could adopt a similar procedure, but has only 
done so once in Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 
 195 Witt, 548 F.3d at 1280 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
 196 Id.  
 197 Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 06-5195RBL, mem. op. at 13 (W.D. Wash. 
Sept. 24, 2010). 
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the specific application of DADT to Major Witt significantly furthers the 
government’s interest, and whether less intrusive means would 
substantially achieve the government’s interest.”198  The government’s 
purpose in promulgating DADT, as evidenced in the Congressional 
findings of the statute, was to promote high unit morale, good order, and 
unit cohesion.199  The court noted that the only evidence that Major 
Witt’s reinstatement would adversely affect unit morale or cohesion was 
contained in surveys and polls that indicated that some “persons in the 
446th AES who would prefer that gays and lesbians not serve openly 
within their unit but such preferences are not outcome determinative 
here.”200  The fact that some servicemembers may dislike serving 
alongside gays and lesbians “is off-set by the known negative impact of 
DADT upon the military: the loss of highly skilled and trained military 
personnel once they have been outed and the concomitant assault on unit 
morale and cohesion caused by their extraction from the military.”201  
After determining that dismissal from service was not the least intrusive 
means to achieve the government’s interest, the final order of the court 
was that Major Witt “should be reinstated at the earliest possible 
moment.”202 
3. Cook v. Gates, First Circuit 
Although the First Circuit in Cook v. Gates203 agreed with much of 
the reasoning set forth in Witt, it departed from the Ninth Circuit in 
certain respects.  The First Circuit declined to apply the three-factor 
intermediate scrutiny test and the required deference to Congress,204 
creating a split with the Ninth Circuit on these issues.  The First Circuit, 
however, agreed with the Ninth Circuit that heightened scrutiny should 
apply to cases implicating the interests developed in Lawrence, and thus 
the First Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in its split with the Eleventh 
Circuit on this point.205 
The First Circuit noted that there are many courts that have read 
Lawrence to require only rational basis review206 while others have 
                                                                                                                            
 198 Id. at 2 (citing Witt, 527 F.3d at 821). 
 199 Id. at 5 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 654(a)(14-15) (2006)). 
 200 Id. at 12. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 56. 
 206 See, e.g., Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 
412 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 
(11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Childr & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 
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viewed Lawrence as requiring strict scrutiny.207  Finally, a third, smaller 
group of courts have viewed Lawrence as requiring some other form of 
scrutiny that rests between strict scrutiny and rational basis.208  The First 
Circuit falls within the ambit of the third category, recognizing that 
Lawrence protected a liberty interest and applied a balancing test which 
sets the review standard somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational 
basis.209 
The court found four reasons why Lawrence can be read as 
protecting a liberty interest.  First, the court noted that the Lawrence 
court relied upon fundamental rights cases in its analysis.210  These 
fundamental rights cases placed the liberty interest in Lawrence with the 
constitutional zone of privacy.  Second, the language of the Court in 
Lawrence revolved around notions of freedom and liberty, extending this 
notion of liberty to adult, consensual sexual activity.211  Third, the Court 
overruled Bowers and held the Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in 
Bowers should now be controlling.212  Finally, if Lawrence had applied 
mere rational basis review, the Supreme Court would have sustained the 
Texas criminal law and not overturned it.213 
The court refuted the three main reasons other courts have held that 
Lawrence review was merely rational basis review.  First, even though 
                                                                                                                            
(11th Cir. 2004); Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143 (W.D. 
Wash. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded to 527 F.3d 806 (2008), rehearing en 
banc denied 548 F.3d 1264 (2008); United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 
2d 578, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 310 (2007); State v. 
Lowe, 861 N.E.2d 512, 517 (Ohio 2007); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 29 (Kan. 2005); 
Ex parte Morales, 212 S.W.3d 483, 493 (Tex. App. 2006); Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 
42 (2005); State v. Clinkenbeard, 123 P.3d 872, 878 (Wash. App. 2005). 
 207 See, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d at 1252 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Barkett, J., dissenting); Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 871 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev’d 
on other grounds, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005); Hudson Valley Black Press v. IRS, 307 
F. Supp. 2d 543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 271 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2003). See also Donald H. J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf Off 
the Right of Privacy: Sex and the Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 969 (2005); 
Tribe, supra note 15, at 1917. 
 208 See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004). See also, Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence 
Beyond Gay Rights: Taking the Rationality Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes 
Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 276 (2005); John G. Culhane, Writing on, Around and 
Through Lawrence v. Texas, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 493 (2005); Nancy C. Marcus, 
Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 355 (2006); Jerald A. Sharum, Comment, Controlling Conduct: The 
Emerging Protection of Sodomy in the Military, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2006). 
 209 Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 210 Id. at 52. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
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Lawrence did not call the right “fundamental,” several other Supreme 
Court cases214 all described the substantive due process rights in terms of 
either “liberty interests” or “protected liberty,” and not as 
“fundamental.”215  Second, the court stated that the argument that 
Lawrence did not rely on an analysis of the nation’s history and tradition 
is “based on the mistaken premise that the only history relevant to the 
substantive due process inquiry is a history demonstrating affirmative 
government action to protect the right in question.”216  The court argued 
that Lawrence’s thorough historical analysis is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent in the area.217  Third, the argument that because the 
majority did not respond to Justice Scalia’s assertion that the Court had 
failed to recognize a protected liberty interest, thereby affirming that 
assertion, is but one possible explanation for the majority’s silence. The 
majority may have been relying on the fact that the opinion stood for 
itself, “and that there was little to be gained by debating Justice Scalia on 
this point.”218 
The First Circuit held that Lawrence is “another in this line of 
Supreme Court authority that identifies a protected liberty interest and 
then applies a standard of review that lies between strict scrutiny and 
rational basis.”219  Lawrence, as the First Circuit saw it, “balanced the 
strength of the state’s asserted interest in prohibiting immoral conduct 
against the degree of intrusion into the petitioners’ private sexual  
life . . . .”220  The court held that even under heightened scrutiny, a facial 
challenge to DADT must fail because facial challenges are the most 
demanding constitutional challenges, the Lawrence court was explicit in 
limiting the liberty interest, noting that it does not protect all forms of 
sexual intimacy, the court found that a facial challenge to DADT must 
fail.221 
The court then turned its analysis to an as-applied challenge to the 
law under the due process clause. The court found that the government’s 
asserted interests were significant enough to overcome the intrusion on 
the protected liberty interest because of the force of judicial deference to 
                                                                                                                            
 214 Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979). 
 215 Cook, 528 F.3d at 53 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; 
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 132–41). 
 218 Id. at 54. 
 219 Id. at 56. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Cook, 528 F.3d at 56. 
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Congress when regulating the military as applied.222  The court indicated 
two primary reasons for such deference.  First, institutional competence, 
as Congress is best equipped, through its committee hearing and 
informational gathering processes, to determine what policies best serve 
the armed forces.223  Second, constitutional power, as Congress, under 
Article I, is the branch of government expressly granted the power and 
authority to “raise and support armies” as well as “make all laws 
necessary and proper to that end.”224  The court held that “where 
Congress has articulated a substantial government interest for a law, and 
where the challenges in question implicate that interest, judicial intrusion 
is simply not warranted.”225  Due to these reasons, as-applied challenges 
to DADT must also fail.226 
The court’s final point on as-applied challenges was that 
Congress’s interest is substantial, and judicial deference prevents judicial 
overstep.227  This point breaks with the decision in Witt, forming the 
second point of departure from the Ninth Circuit in the three-way circuit 
split.  This reasoning is also suspect following the line of military court 
cases that do not rely on such deference.228  Finally, now that DADT is 
being repealed and Congress’s interest has changed, there likely would 
have been a different outcome in Cook. 
III. THE MORALITY OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” AND ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF LAWRENCE, LOFTON,  
WITT, AND COOK 
The morality of DADT is not important per se, but it is important in 
order to resolve its classification as a purely moral-based law or as 
composite or embedded.  The Supreme Court’s taxonomy regarding 
morality-based legislation, which defines each category of morality-
based laws, is useful because it allows us to fit the decision in Lawrence 
together with the standard of scrutiny applied in Witt and Cook to 
determine whether DADT would pass constitutional muster.229  If DADT 
is purely moral-based, a law justified only by morality, then there is no 
reason to even apply Witt and Cook’s heightened review.230  If the law is 
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morally embedded or composite, wherein morality is an implicit or 
explicit judgment in the law, then a successful challenge would require 
heightened review.231  This framework could also, at least theoretically, 
apply to other laws beyond DADT like UCMJ Article 125. 
The three-way circuit split between Lofton, Witt, and Cook poses 
three distinct challenges to future courts considering the application of 
Lawrence to DADT or other morality-based legislation.  First, if we 
presume DADT is based on morality alone, it would fail the lowest 
standard of review, rational basis review.  The Court in Lawrence 
explicitly stated that Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers would be 
controlling, where he stated that morality is not enough to uphold a 
law.232  Second, there are viable arguments that DADT has practical or 
utilitarian objectives in addition to morality, which means that the only 
way to challenge the policy, or one like it, would be under heightened 
review.  Witt and Cook both determined that Lawrence requires 
heightened review.233  Under intermediate scrutiny, as articulated under 
the Witt court’s test, DADT would again fail.234  The Cook court’s 
deference to Congress was erroneous because such deference negates 
intermediate scrutiny, which the court held was necessary following 
Lawrence, and even military courts do not grant such unquestioning 
deference to Congress.235  Finally, Lofton should be accorded less weight 
in determining the standard of review required by Lawrence because the 
Eleventh Circuit expressly determined that Lawrence was not controlling 
in that case.236 
A. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” as a Purely Moral-Based Law  
If we begin with the presumption that DADT is strictly moral-
based, that is, a purely moral law, then the only justification for the law 
is that it represents the moral edict of the governing majority.  If the 
Court truly intended in Lawrence to make Justice Stevens’s Bowers 
dissent controlling, then DADT fails rational basis review. In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens states that morality is not a sufficient basis on which to 
uphold a law.237  If morality is not enough, then a law based solely on 
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 232 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 233 Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 818 (9th Cir. 2008); Cook, 528 F.3d 
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morality does not have a legitimate or rational basis, which is a necessary 
component for the law to be upheld.  Morality, then, should not serve as 
a legitimate sole basis for any legislation, not just DADT. 
B. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” as a Morally Composite or Embedded Law 
The next two questions after determining that DADT or another law 
would fail rational basis review if it is based on morality alone are: 1) Is 
the law based on something more than pure morality?; and 2) If the law 
has utilitarian or practical policy goals beyond morality, can it still be 
successfully challenged under substantive due process?  If the law does 
have a basis beyond pure morality, then the only method of a successful 
challenge would be through heightened review.  Thus, the analysis turns 
on whether the law is pure moral legislation or not. 
1. Is DADT Morally Composite or Embedded? 
The first place to look to determine whether DADT is a composite 
or embedded law is in the policy and the Congressional deliberations.  In 
a Senate Report from the Armed Forces Committee, the Congressional 
record shows that Congress contemplated the implications of DADT on 
the constitutional rights of homosexuals.238  The report concluded that 
even “if the Supreme Court should reverse its ruling in Bowers and hold 
that private consensual homosexual acts between adults may not be 
prosecuted in civilian society, this would not alter the committee’s 
judgment as to the effect of homosexual conduct in the armed forces.”239  
This finding is important because it indicates that even if the Supreme 
Court found that consensual sexual relations between homosexuals were 
protected by the Constitution, Congress would still find that those 
committing homosexual sexual acts in the military must be separated. 
For this assertion to be sustainable, it must mean that DADT is based on 
something more than pure morality. 
Another place to look for possible utilitarian justifications are the 
Congressional findings articulated in the law, the most important of 
which are found in subsections 13 and 15 of 10 U.S.C. § 654(a).  In 
subsection 13, Congress finds that “[t]he prohibition against homosexual 
conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be 
necessary in the unique circumstances of military service.”240  The 
phrasing of this subsection leaves no doubt that Congress is alluding to a 
longer tradition of criminalizing homosexual conduct, in the military as 
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well as in the civilian world, directly following the reasoning of 
Bowers.241  The use of the phrase “unique conditions of military 
service,”242 however, indicates that there is at least something about 
service in the armed forces that warrants this regulation. This finding 
likely reflects a practical goal served by the law. 
In subsection 15, Congress finds that “[t]he presence in the armed 
forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in 
homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards 
of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the 
essence of military capability.”243  This subsection expressly establishes 
Congress’s utilitarian justification for the policy that was hinted at in 
subsection 13, which is the belief that homosexuality is a risk to morale, 
good discipline, and unit cohesion.  This justification demonstrates a 
clearly composite morality basis for the law; it states as its purpose the 
protection of morale, discipline, and unit cohesion, which are all 
practical utilitarian goals, yet the law also makes a moral judgment 
regarding homosexuality as something inconsistent with the military.  
The moral judgment that open homosexuality is subversive, as well as 
the military’s general regulation of sexual conduct between 
servicemembers, demonstrate that DADT is based on something more 
than pure morality. 
The policy aspect of DADT is designed to establish criteria for 
when members of the armed forces are to be separated from the military, 
following regulations to be issued by the Secretary of Defense.244  Under 
the policy provisions of the statute, there are three different reasons for 
which servicemembers can be separated from the military.245 It is 
important to note that there is also an excuse for homosexual conduct 
contained within the policy.246  This listed excuse is important because 
                                                                                                                            
 241 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (noting that laws limiting homosexual rights have ancient 
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the criteria present justifications for otherwise “unlawful” conduct, but 
dissecting each and noting their combination of moral judgments and 
utilitarian elements, another purpose of the law becomes more apparent: 
preventing repeat sexual activity in the military, particularly of the 
homosexual variety. 
The first criterion, that the conduct was outside customary 
behavior,247 depicts Congress’s reluctance to define homosexuality in 
terms of a single act.  This is interesting considering the nature of the 
policy and the specific “risks” it seeks to prevent.  Although Congress 
claimed in DADT that all homosexual acts are a risk to morale, good 
discipline, and unit cohesion, it seems odd that a one-time act of 
indiscretion poses less of a risk, exonerating the servicemember.  This 
excuse provision is in stark contrast to UCMJ Article 125, which does 
not contain such an excuse.248  The excuse provision in DADT exposes a 
utilitarian goal of the law, to punish repeat conduct and not just one-time 
offenses.  Congress, it would seem, recognizes that sexual activity will 
occur in the military, but so long as it only happens once and presumably 
within the bounds of Article 125, it is forgiven under the statute.  Yet if 
the person happens to be an acknowledged homosexual, he or she is 
separated from the military due to his or her propensity to commit a 
repeat act.  The utilitarian goal is therefore the prevention of repeated 
sexual acts that cause disruption, and the moral judgment is that 
homosexual conduct has a greater propensity to cause disruption than 
heterosexual conduct. 
The second criterion, that the conduct is unlikely to recur,249 is a 
mirror image of the first excuse, and therefore warrants limited 
discussion.  It is unlikely that anyone who successfully proves the first 
criterion could not also prove the second.  The presumption in this 
criterion is that if one is a “practicing” homosexual, homosexual acts will 
recur.250 
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The third criterion fits within the ambit of other sexually regulated 
conduct such as rape.  If the servicemember’s homosexual act was 
accomplished through use of force or coercion,251 just like forcible 
intercourse in civilian life, courts should not exonerate that behavior just 
because it is unlikely to recur or because it was outside normal behavior.  
In turn, that member’s separation from the armed forces is both 
reasonable and justified.  Because there is an injury to another, which the 
Court decried in Lawrence, the State has a greater interest in regulating 
such conduct than the individual does in exercising his or her liberty 
interest. 
The fourth criterion, that “the member’s continued presence in the 
armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces,”252 
seems to be the most subjective and utilitarian of the criteria.  If the 
military has deemed homosexuality and homosexual conduct as risks to 
morale, discipline, and unit cohesion, it seems contradictory to determine 
that it is in the military’s best interest to retain someone who committed 
such an act.  This provision, as it reads, seems to suggest that the military 
is willing to overlook the indiscretion of some soldiers and not others, 
based merely on the military’s needs and the servicemember-in-
question’s ability to satisfy those needs overrides the moral disapproval 
of that person’s conduct. 
The fifth criterion, delineating “propensity or intent to engage in 
homosexual acts,”253 seems primarily aimed at character, which is really 
intended to indicate the likelihood of one to engage in the restricted 
conduct.  This is significant because it is possible that in a separation 
proceeding, an open or “practicing” homosexual is most likely to be 
found to have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, no 
matter how celibate he or she might be, just do to his or her openness.  
For this reason, this criterion is the least utilitarian, and the one most 
embedded with morality. 
Another section of DADT relevant to understanding the policy 
justifications is 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3), which defines “homosexual act.”  
Included within this definition is “(A) any bodily contact, actively 
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for 
the purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and (B) any bodily contact 
which a reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a propensity 
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or intent to engage in an act described in subparagraph (A).”254  The 
broad language of this provision makes almost any act between two 
persons of the same sex a homosexual act for which they can be 
separated from the military.  This is particularly interesting when 
compared to Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 125, Sodomy,255 
which defines sodomy as any “unnatural carnal copulation with another 
person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal . . . .”256  If one 
compares the two definitions side by side, they demonstrate that 
heterosexual and homosexual servicemembers alike are punished for 
certain sexual behavior in the military.  This presents a common utility of 
preventing sexual activity between servicemembers.  The difference 
between the two policies is that where both laws punish soldiers for their 
conduct, homosexuals were, and possibly still are, almost automatically 
separated from the military for their conduct under DADT, whereas their 
heterosexual counterparts are not under Article 125.  Article 125 does not 
contain a separation provision like DADT.257  This difference between 
the two policies then leads to the conclusion that what is really driving 
the policy behind “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is morality with some 
embedded or composite justifications. 
Considering DADT in light of morality-based classifications, we 
see that DADT relies heavily on embedded and composite justification.  
Though the explicit aims of DADT were to prevent the risks that 
homosexuality poses to unit cohesion, morale, and good discipline, 
inherent in DADT was the moral judgment that homosexuality is 
somehow wrong, and this moral judgment therefore becomes a 
justification for the policy.  If one reads the target of homosexuality as an 
explicit moral judgment, then the law would be composite, yet if the law 
is read as an implicit moral judgment, it would be a moral-embedded 
law.  Because DADT contains provisions that could be read either way, it 
may be either or both, indicating that some form of heightened review 
would be necessary for DADT to be unconstitutional. 
2. Marcum Proves that Lawrence’s Liberty Interest Applies to 
UCMJ Article 125 Challenges 
Article 125, which prohibits sodomy, and is similar to the laws that 
Lawrence struck down, is useful to rebut the First Circuit’s argument in 
Cook that courts should give significant deference to Congress’s power 
to regulate the military and dismiss such cases.  First, because Article 
                                                                                                                            
 254 Id. at § 654(f)(3). 
 255 Id. at § 925. 
 256 Id. 
 257 10 U.S.C. §925. 
192 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 7:155 
125 is a military measure and part of the UCMJ, a parallel to DADT can 
easily be drawn in terms of Congress’s power to regulate the military.  
Second, the line of cases interpreting military policy regarding sexual 
conduct under Article 125 demonstrates the way military courts, 
including the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, consider the 
application of the policy after Lawrence.  If the military courts, with their 
close link to the armed services, are willing to deem certain applications 
of Article 125 unconstitutional after Lawrence, then there is no clear 
reason for granting the deference to Congress under DADT that the First 
Circuit argues for in Cook. 
Under Article 125, military courts have applied Lawrence primarily 
because the conduct prohibited under this article, sodomy, is so closely 
associated with the Lawrence decision.  United States v. Marcum258 is the 
leading case in this discussion.  In this case, a servicemember asserted 
that his conviction under Article 125 must be set aside following 
Lawrence.259  The court began by stating, “Constitutional rights generally 
apply to members of the armed forces unless by their express terms, or 
the express language of the Constitution, they are inapplicable.”260  
Considering the extent of the liberty interest protected in Lawrence, the 
court noted that many other courts have grappled with the standard of 
review Lawrence requires.261  The court noted that the use of strict 
scrutiny would prove dispositive in a facial challenge to Article 125.262  
Like the circuit courts in Lofton, Witt, and Cook, the Marcum court said 
that because the Supreme Court did not indicate whether the right was 
“fundamental,” it refuses to presume the existence of such a right and 
apply strict scrutiny.263  The court held that Lawrence requires “searching 
constitutional inquiry,” which may require a court to inquire beyond 
categorical determinations of whether the interest at issue is within the 
interest articulated in Lawrence or whether it is part of the exceptions 
listed in Lawrence.264  The court ruled that under this test Marcum’s 
conduct was outside the Lawrence liberty interest because the person 
with whom Marcum had sexual relations was a person within his chain 
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of command.265  This lent an air of coercion to the relationship, creating a 
situation where consent might not easily be refused and therefore 
removing the acts from Lawrence’s protection.266  This determination in 
Marcum was consistent with the Lawrence court’s determination that the 
right does not involve “persons who might be injured or coerced or who 
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused.”267 
After establishing this heightened standard of review, the Marcum 
court developed a three-question test for future military courts to use 
when considering whether the sexual conduct in question is protected by 
the liberty interest in Lawrence.268  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, reviewing decisions from the courts of the various 
military branches, this test would become binding precedent as well as 
the basis for almost all constitutional challenges to Article 125 after 
Lawrence.269  Some courts have found servicemembers’ conduct 
protected within Lawrence’s liberty interest,270 but this has not been the 
majority of cases.271 
What these cases indicate is that courts, even military courts, are 
sustaining challenges to military policy and Congressional authority after 
Lawrence.  On the one hand, military courts have upheld policies like a 
Coast Guard policy prohibiting romantic relationships272 and regulations 
for the Corps of Cadets.273  On the other hand, they have also held that 
“the government cannot claim a heightened interest in controlling the 
specific sexual acts between [servicemembers] merely because those acts 
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took place in a barracks room”274 and the fact that court-martialing a 
soldier may decrease his unit’s morale is an insufficient basis for 
dismissing him.275  These cases indicate that even military courts are 
prepared to question Congress like the court did in Witt; however, it 
remains unclear whether “unit cohesion” would satisfy the Sell test as a 
constitutionally valid justification for DADT.  It is also dubious whether 
separation from the military significantly furthers the government’s 
interest in unit cohesion or “whether less intrusive means would achieve 
substantially the government’s interest.”276  If unit cohesion was really 
the reason for DADT, then how does separating a decorated officer, like 
Major Witt, improve unit cohesion?  The First Circuit should have 
followed the military courts’ questioning of Congress’s justification 
rather than relying on legislative deference. 
Another important fact to consider when contemplating Article 125 
is that the seminal decision in Marcum was decided in 2004, before 
either Witt or Cook were decided.  The significance of the timing of these 
cases is that Marcum’s three-prong test interpreting the liberty interest in 
Lawrence is still binding precedent on any of the lower military courts.  
Because Marcum was decided before Witt and Cook, the Marcum court 
did not have the benefit of the persuasive reasoning of the Ninth or First 
Circuits’ decisions. 
The pertinent question is whether the same heightened scrutiny that 
applied in Witt and Cook could be applied in the Article 125 context.  
The Marcum court explicitly stated that strict scrutiny would prove 
dispositive in a facial challenge to Article 125, but did not hold that such 
a standard applied.277  Instead, the court found that Lawrence required a 
searching constitutional inquiry, which is not language typical of mere 
rational basis review.278  This vagueness might mean that the standard of 
heightened scrutiny that both the Witt and Cook courts call for would 
also prove dispositive in a challenge to Article 125, particularly in light 
of the Sell test adopted by the court in Witt.  Also, the fact that Marcum 
is binding on military courts does not mean that it is binding on other 
courts, particularly federal district courts, where a case challenging the 
validity of Article 125 could be brought.  This means that even though 
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DADT has been repealed by Congress, though enforcement of the repeal 
is still unclear, the line of reasoning from Lawrence to Witt to Cook 
would still be relevant in the context of Congress’s regulation of private, 
consensual sexual acts that occur in the military between 
servicemembers or between a servicemember and civilian through the 
operation of the UCMJ Article 125.  Witt and Cook, following Lawrence, 
are useful as a basis for challenging the constitutionality of other acts of 
Congress regulating the military in addition their direct applicability to 
DADT. 
3. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Would Fail Heightened Review under 
Witt 
Because Cook’s deference can be discounted following Marcum 
and its progeny, and because it seems clear that DADT has at least some 
utilitarian policy justifications, it is still possible that DADT could have 
been constitutional.  For that reason, it is necessary to consider how 
DADT would have fared under heightened review.  Although both Cook 
and Witt found that Lawrence required more than just rational basis 
review, only Witt provided a clear test for the intermediate scrutiny it 
found applicable.  The dispositive element of this test for DADT is that 
there must be no “alternative, less intrusive [policy likely] to achieve 
substantially the same results . . . .”279 
Applying this standard of review to DADT demonstrates that 
DADT would again fail to pass constitutional muster.  There are likely 
hundreds of less intrusive alternatives to DADT’s separation procedures 
that achieve the government’s objectives as articulated in the 
Congressional findings, the most obvious of which is Article 125.  Once 
DADT is fully repealed, the sexual conduct DADT sought to prevent 
would be prevented under Article 125 by punishing homosexuals in the 
same way it punishes heterosexuals.  This means that DADT, even with 
composite or embedded justifications, still fails under heightened review, 
which Witt and Cook both called for.  This, however, leaves doubt as to 
whether Article 125 is still constitutional, or whether the military will 
recommend changes to Article 125 now that DADT has been repealed.280 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
When Lawrence was decided, it “offered a possibility wherein the 
moral views of the majority could not control the sexual lives of 
individuals.”281  Lawrence created the promise of a more potent liberty 
interest that could defend the gay community against the animus and 
stigma of the moral majority while promoting individual autonomy and 
the dignity our Constitution guarantees.282  Because Bowers was the only 
contemporary Supreme Court case that sustained a law on morality 
rationale alone,283 it makes sense that the Court overruled it in Lawrence. 
Lawrence offered a path towards full acceptance of homosexuality in 
society. 
Although full acceptance has yet to manifest itself, social trends are 
moving away from the “second class” status attributed to 
homosexuals.284  In recent months, two cases decided in federal court in 
Massachusetts determined that the Defense of Marriage Act, commonly 
referred to as DOMA, is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment,285 
as well as the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause.286  In 
addition, a federal district court judge in California ruled in August 2010 
that a constitutional amendment to the California state constitution that 
made same-sex marriages illegal was a violation of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.287  And relevant 
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Obama100days/story?id=7459488&page=1&page=1. 
 285 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010) (Judge 
Joseph Tauro found that “irrational prejudice never constitutes a legitimate government 
interest,” and for that reason, he ruled that DOMA “violates the equal protection 
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 286 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 698 F. Supp 2d 234, 253 
(D. Mass. 2010) (Judge Tauro, who decided the sister case in Gill, determined that 
DOMA also violates the Tenth Amendment to the constitution as well as the spending 
clause). 
 287 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C09-2292VRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78817, at 
*217 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010). 
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to the discussion herein, a federal district court judge in California ruled 
that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell violates the First and Fifth Amendments, and 
issued a permanent injunction barring its applicability, which was 
ultimately stayed by the Ninth Circuit.288  Most importantly, Congress 
acted to repeal DADT,289 and President Obama signed the bill into 
law.290 
Cases like Witt and Cook, which raise the Constitutional bar for 
laws that have no basis other than moral judgment against 
homosexuality, prove that there is hope for complete and genuine 
equality.291  In the wake of Romer, Lawrence, and Witt, it might be more 
difficult to defend laws that restrict homosexual rights, whether 
concerning service in the military or the recognition of marriage equality 
for LGBT persons.  These cases, which may be the basis of a future 
Supreme Court challenge, provide a framework that creates some 
optimism about protection of LGBT rights. 
If the Court truly meant what it said in Lawrence and what it did 
when it overruled Bowers and made Justice Stevens’s dissent controlling, 
then the following points can be deduced.  First, absent injury to another 
or an institution the law protects, the state should not regulate a person’s 
exercise of liberty.292  Second, that liberty interest is further bolstered 
when it takes place within the home.293  Finally, and most significantly, 
morality is an insufficient basis on which to uphold a law.294 
The application of these principles to the failed policy known as 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is as follows: if DADT was based on morality 
alone, then the law would fail under rational basis review because the 
government’s interest is not legitimate.  If DADT was a composite or 
moral-embedded law, then only heightened scrutiny could overcome and 
enable the Court to strike the law down.  Fortunately, as we have seen, 
                                                                                                                            
 288 Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. CV 04-08425-VAP, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 93612, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010), rev’d, No. 10-56634, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22655 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2010).  The First Amendment claim in this case was 
unique in that the law was challenged on the fact that gay and lesbian servicemembers 
cannot tell anyone about their sexuality in their profession, which the court ruled was an 
unconstitutional infringement of their right to free speech.  Id. 
 289 Hulse, supra note 33. 
 290 Gell, supra note 34. 
 291 See, e.g., Christopher A. Scott, Case Note, Cook v. Gates: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
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 292 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 293 As part of the constitutional guarantee to privacy, the home is nearly sacrosanct.  
See, e.g. U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV, V, XIV. 
 294 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Witt and Cook provide us with a model for an analysis using heightened 
review, extracted from the Court’s own decision in Lawrence.  Cook’s 
deference is questionable following Marcum and its progeny, and Lofton 
can be discounted because the Eleventh Circuit explicitly says that 
Lawrence was not controlling in that case,295 making its discussion of 
Lawrence obiter dictum. 
Of the courts to address DADT after Lawrence, only the Witt court 
succeeded in understanding and appreciating the full liberty interest at 
stake in Lawrence and applying it to the case at bar.  The First Circuit 
was mistaken in its unequivocal grant of deference to Congress.  It failed 
to acknowledge the practical implications such deference would have on 
the holding that heightened scrutiny must apply.  If courts give deference 
to Congress’s determinations like the court did in Cook, there is no point 
in applying heightened scrutiny because any interest Congress asserts is 
sufficient to uphold the law, meaning that challenges will unequivocally 
fail.  Only the Ninth Circuit in Witt correctly applied heightened scrutiny 
to its logical conclusion by not abdicating its decision to Congress by 
upholding the Fourteenth Amendment. 
DADT was abandoned because it was a failed policy, with 
numerous servicemembers attesting to its failures.  Yet the current 
interim period leaves servicemembers in doubt as to the applicability of 
the law and the status of their rights while DADT is still in effect.296  
This case law provides them a constitutional claim against any 
application of DADT as well as a claim against any past application of 
DADT that prevents someone from reenlisting in the armed forces.  
Regardless of whether DADT’s basis was morality or morality plus, Witt 
provides a framework and a standard of review that any court could 
follow to strike down the law.  And Witt does not even consider the 
moral duty we owe to our national security or the moral duty we owe to 
the men and women who choose to serve to protect us all.  If the 
Supreme Court truly wanted to take a stand and show how far it has 
come in its understanding of the human condition, it should hold that 
LGBT individuals are a protected class, and any laws curtailing LGBT 
rights must be considered under the most searching constitutional 
scrutiny—strict scrutiny.  Now that Congress has acted to repeal DADT, 
it is time for the Court to do something about the ongoing discrimination 
                                                                                                                            
 295 Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Childr And Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (“the holding of Lawrence does not control the present case. Apart from the 
shared homosexuality component, there are marked differences in the facts of the two 
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 296 Scarborough, supra note 61. 
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against homosexuals by deeming them a protected class under the 
constitution. 
